The US is set to upgrade Guam’s formidable missile defenses with a new command and control system to coordinate the strategic island’s disjointed defenses against various emerging threats amid vulnerabilities in US air and missile defense kill chains. 

Newsweek reports that Northrop Grumman’s recent successful Integrated Battle Command System test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico showcased its ability to use sensor data effectively to acquire, track, engage and intercept a long-range cruise missile surrogate. 

The IBCS ingeniously connects sensors not initially designed to work together into one control system and was approved for production by the US Department of Defense last year. This system creates a network among sensors like radars for any shooter and has integrated weapons such as Patriot missiles, F-35 aircraft, and Giraffe search radars.

The IBCS is poised for deployment in Guam. This strategic move will integrate the island’s formidable missile and air defenses, bolstering its resilience against ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons and drone threats. 

In August 2023, Asia Times reported on the United States’ comprehensive plan to bolster Guam’s missile defenses against potential missile attacks from China and North Korea. The plan involves installing a layered missile defense system called Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD), which includes Aegis Ashore, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Typhon and Patriot systems.

The core of EIAMD is expected to be the Aegis Ashore system, but its exact configuration in Guam is yet to be determined, highlighting the ongoing strategic planning.

Further, Asia Times reported in May 2023 that the US planned to upgrade Guam’s missile defenses by providing AN/TPY-6 radar for integrated air and missile defense, tied to a disaggregated Aegis Ashore on the periphery. The US is considering building the Aegis Ashore facility as an extension of Anderson Air Force Base or an underground facility.

China and North Korea possess missiles such as the DF-26, Hwasong 14 and Hwasong 15 that can potentially put Guam within strike range, threatening US forces stationed there.

Aside from that, China and North Korea possess hypersonic weapons designed to penetrate any current and future US missile defense systems. 

In November 2022, Asia Times reported that a new air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) had been spotted on China’s Xian H-6K bomber, which could potentially target US bases and forces in the Pacific. These missiles are believed to be derived from the supersonic CM-401 missile and are designed to combine the missile’s combat characteristics with the H-6K strategic bomber’s increased standoff range. The H6-K air launch can significantly increase the missile’s range and terminal performance, adding 3,500 kilometers to the missile’s 260-kilometer range at speeds of Mach 6. 

In September 2020, China released a video that appeared to be a warning to the US military stationed in Guam. The video depicted an H6-K bomber launching a missile at a target that resembled Anderson Air Base.

Further, Asia Times reported this month that North Korea had conducted a test on a new intermediate-range solid-fuel missile called the Hwasong-16B. The country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un supervised the test. He considers this missile to be an essential component of the country’s nuclear deterrence and promised to increase North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to counter countries the North Koreans perceive as their enemies, especially the US, South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff have recognized that North Korea is making progress with its missile technology, but they have accused the country of overstating missiles’ flight capabilities. It is unclear whether North Korea has the necessary technology to guarantee that the warheads of its hypersonic solid-fuel missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles can survive the challenging conditions of atmospheric re-entry.

Nevertheless, should North Korea develop long-range hypersonic missiles, Guam would most likely be in its sights. Pyongyang has threatened the US territory before with missile strikes. 

Aside from missiles, cruise missile-launched swarming drones can also pose a threat to Guam, overwhelming the island’s missile defenses with their sheer number.  

In March 2024, Asia Times reported that a group of scientists in China had reportedly developed a new type of drone that could be split into several smaller drones, each with a specific role such as surveillance, tracking, command and even attack. If weaponized, these drones, after being packed into a cluster warhead, could autonomously search for and destroy targets with precision and range. 

Asia Times has pointed out that Guam faces a significant air and missile defense challenge. The current disjointed air and missile defense systems may not be enough to protect against advanced weapons such as drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons.

Defeating a saturation attack on Guam involving many missiles and drones requires an integrated sensor system that covers domains including space and cyberspace.

While the IBCS is a significant step in integrating Guam’s disjointed missile defenses against various threats, the kill chains behind those defenses may still be vulnerable to kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. Kill chains are the processes, systems, physical sensors, datalinks, platforms, and weapons involved in finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging targets and assessing battle damage.

In October 2023, Asia Times stated that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had discussed a new “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare” (MDPW) concept, which aims to quickly identify vulnerabilities in the US operational system and kill chains and then launch precision kinetic and non-kinetic strikes on those weaknesses. 

Further, Heather Penney notes in a July 2023 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that US kill chains are inflexible and lack diversity in sharing information among different components. Penney points out that the fixed connections between the components and the centralized decision-making approach characteristic of US operations are unsuitable for a large-scale conflict in the Indo-Pacific region and cannot adjust to the loss of elements or disruptions in communication.